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CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY AMONG
TORTFEASORS IN MINNESOTA
Contribution and indemnity may be defined as principles which
permit one who is liable to another to shift a part or the whole
of his liability to a third person. Because many aspects of the law
of contribution and indemnity are identical, it is possible to treat
much of these subjects jointly; but fundamentally contribution and
indemnity have different bases." Although it developed in Law
rather than Equity, contribution has been said to have been founded
on the maxim that "equity is equality" ;2 and thus the party who
seeks to recover contribution endeavors to shift a part, rather than
the whole, of his liability to another. When indemnity is recovered,
however, the entire burden of liability is shifted. The party who
can recover indemnity is usually one whose liability to the original
plaintiff was merely nominal as compared with the liability of the
party from whom indemnity is sought. There appear to be several
different theories which seek to explain why indemnity among
tortfeasors is allowed. 3
CONTRIBUTION

There was no clear decision at common law on the general right
of the unintentional joint tortfeasor to recover contribution. The
4
denied contribution in a
leading case of Merryweather v. Nixan1
situation in which the joint tort appears to have been intentional. A
number of the early American cases appeared to accept the idea
that there might be contribution among unintentional tortfeasors.r
These decisions generally fall within two classes: 1. where the original defendant was held liable on the basis of respondent superior,
and 2. when a wrongful attachment was made at the direction of
judgment creditors.7 Eventually, however, most American courts
followed Merryweather v. NVi.an and denied contribution whether
1. See Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Northwestern Tel. Co., 140 Minn. 229,
167 N. W. 800 (1918), where the court confused the two.
2. See Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 235
Minn. 304, 310, 50 N. W. 2d 689, 693 (1951) ; see 2 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 411 (5th ed., Symons, 1941).
3. See p. 468 infra.
4. 8 T. R. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1779). The tort in this case
was conversion. See Prosser, Torts 1112 (1941).
5. See Prosser, Torts 1113 (1941).
6. E.g., Farney v. Hauser, 109 Kan. 75, 198 Pac. 178 (1921) (partnership-tortious acts of manager); Hobbs v. Hurley, 117 Me. 449, 104 Atl.
815 (1918) ; Horbach's Adm'rs v. Elder, 18 Pa. 33 (1851).
7. Vandiver & Co. v. Pollak, 97 Ala. 467, 12 So. 473 (1893) ; Farwell
v. Becker, 129 I1. 261, 21 N. E. 792 (1889).
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the original tort was intentional or negligent.$ Only Minnesota0 and
five jurisdictions"o have in recent times permitted contribution
among unintentional tortfeasors. Elsewhere in the United States,
the right to recover contribution, if allowed, is statutory."
The only Minnesota statute'12 dealing with contribution is procedural rather than substantive. 13 The first Minnesota case to deal
with contribution among tortfeasors was Ankeny v. Moffett"4 decided in 1887. Factually the case could fall within the supposed respondent superior exception 15 to the common lav rule against contribution among tortfeasors, but the Minnesota Supreme Court in
reaching the recision did not appear to consider the case as such;
it stated that the rule against contribution applied only where the
person seeking it was guilty of an intentional wrong or might be
presumed to have knowingly done an illegal act. The Ankeny case
S. E.g., Union Stock Yards Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 196 U. S.
217 (1905) ; Adams v. White Bus Line, 184 Cal. 710, 195 Pac. 389 (1921);
Portland v. Citizens Tel. Co., 206 Mich. 632, 173 N. W. 382 (1919) ; Public
Service Ry. v. Matteucci, 105 N. J. L. 114, 143 Atl. 221 (1928) ; Royal Indem.
Co. v. Becker, 122 Ohio St. 582, 173 N. E. 194 (1930). This wholesale denial
tf contribution has met with the approval of only one recent commentator.
See Fleming, ContributionAmong Joint Tortfeasors: A Pragmatic Criticism,
E4 Harv. L. Rev. 1156 (1941). Fleming expresses opposition to contribution
because it hinders settlements and may result in a less effective social distribution
of accident loss. This article influenced the dissent of Edgerton, J., in George's
Radio, Inc. v. Capital Transit Co., 126 F. 2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
9. E.g., Duluth, M. & N. Ry. v. McCarthy, 183 Minn. 414, 236 N. W.
766 (1931).
10. District of Columbia: George's Radio, Inc. v. Capital Transit Co.,
126 F. 2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1942) ; Louisiana: Quatray v. Wicker, 178 La. 289,
151 So. 208 (1931) (civil law solidary liability) ; Pennsylvania: Goldman v.
Mitchell-Fletcher Co., 292 Pa. 354, 141 Atl. 231 (1928) ; Tennessee: Davis v.
Broad St. Garage, 191 Tenn. 320, 232 S. W. 2d 355 (1950) ; Wisconsin: Ellis
v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 167 Wis. 392, 167 N. W. 1048 (1918).
11. Ark. Stat. § 34-1001 et seq. (1947), as amended, Ark. Stat. § 34-1002
(Supp. 1951) ; Del. Laws 1949, c. 151; Ga. Code Ann. § 105-2012 (1935);
Hawaii Rev. Laws §§ 10487-10493 (1945) ; Ky. Rev. Stat. § 412.030 (1948)
Md. Ann. Code Gen. Laws art. 50, §§ 20-29 (1951); Mich. Comp. Laws
§§ 691.561-691-564 (1948); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.060 (1949); N. M. Stat.
Arm. §§ 21-118 etseq. (Supp. 1951) ; N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 211-a; N. C. Gen.
Stat. § 1-240 (1943); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, §§2082-2089 (Supp. 1951);
R. I. Acts & Resolves 1940, c. 940; S. D. Laws 1945, c, 167; Tex. Stat.,
Rev. Civ. art. 2212 (1950); Va. Code § 8-627 (1950); W. Va. Code Ann.
§ 5482 (1949). Georgia, Michigan, Missouri, New York, Texas, and West Virginia have joint judgment statutes rather than statutes based on common
liability. The most recent attempt to regularize and expand contribution is the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, 9 U. L. A. 156 (1951), which
has been adopted by Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland, New Mexico,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and South Dakota.
12. Minn. Stat. § 548.19 (1949).
13. Kemerer v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 201 Minn. 239, 276 N. W.
228 (1937). But cf. Fort Scott v. Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. R. R., 66 Kan.
610, 72 Pac. 238 (1903), where a similar statute was held to create a sub;tantive right of contribution between tortfeasors.
14. 37 Minn. 109, 33 N. W. 320 (1887).
15. See note 6 supra, and text thereto.
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has been followed or approved by the court since the date that it
was decided.16
Recovery of contribution in Minnesota is dependent on two conditions. First, there must be common legal liability on the part of
the tortfeasors toward the injured person. 7 Common liability has
been said by the Minnesota court to come into existence "immediately after the acts of the tortfeasors which give rise to the cause
of action against them."' 18 Apparently common liability has been
conceived as being liability which is enforcible against each tortfeasor individually at some time after the tortious occurence; but
common legal liability is inadequate as one of the necessary conditions precedent to the recovery of contribution in view of its basic
rationale that "equity is equality." Instances are not uncommon
when one of the tortfeasors has at the time of the tort a personal
defense against the injured person which negates the possibility of
personal legal liability and thus makes common liability a logical impossibility. If the purpose of contribution is to make the wrongdoers
share in the financial burden of their wrong, then the primary element of contribution should be the participation of the wrongdoers
in acts or omissions which are commonly considered tortious and
which result in the injury of a third person. Since the element of common liability is usually present when contribution is sought, it is
possible that the courts have inadvertently considered it as one of
the the necessary elements of contribution without realizing that
it is an inadequate basis for achieving the basic aim of contribution.' 9
The second condition on which the recovery of contribution depends is the payment of a disproportionate share of the liability.2
It is settled in Minnesota that payment pursuant to a judgment is
not a condition precedent to obtaining contribution. 2' The pay16. E.g., Duluth, M. & N. Ry. v. McMarthy, 183 Minn.414, 236 N. W.

766 (1931) ; Underwriters at Lloyds v. Smith, 166 Minn. 388, 208 N. W. 13
(1926).

17. American Automobile Ins. Co. v. Molling, Minn. Sup. Ct., April 2,
1953 ;see Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 235

Minn. 304, 309, 50 N. W. 2d 689, 693 (1951) ; American Motorists Ins. Co. v.
Vigen, 213 Minn. 120, 123, 5 N. W. 2d 397, 399 (1942).
18. Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 235
Minn. 304, 309, 50 N. W. 2d 689, 693 (1951).
19. The Uniform Act, however, has adopted the common liability requirement. 9 U. L. A. Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act § 1
(1951).
20. Duluth, M. & N. Ry. v. McCarthy, 183 Minn. 414, 236 N. W. 766
(1931); cf. Canosia v. Grand Lake, 80 Minn. 357, 83 N. W. 346 (1900);
see American Motorist Ins. Co. v. Vigen, 213 Minn. 120, 123, 5. N. W. 2d
397, 399 (1942).
21. Duluth, M. & N. Ry.v.McCarthy, =pra note 20; accord, Wabasha
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ment must be compulsory only in that the party who makes it has
a legal obligation to do so.2 2 Thus, one who settles the claim may
thereafter litigate the issues of liability with those from whom the
contribution is sought. Contingent claims for contribution or indemnity may also be litigated at present before judgment is rendered
in the main action.23
Intentional torts. Since Merryweather v. Nixon the courts have
quite uniformly denied contribution to intentional tortfeasors. 24 The
Minnesota Supreme Court has extended this principle much further
than have most courts. In Ankeny v. Moffett,2 Justice Mitchell
stated that the rule against contribution was applicable when it was
presumed that the tortfeasor knew he was doing an "illegal" act.
The full import of this statement was not shown until the court decided Fidelity & Casualty Co. v.Christenson, 6 in which it was held
that the violation of a traffic statute prevented recovery of contribution. The court reasoned that since the act was illegal and volitional
it was intentional within the area defined by Justice Mitchell where
there could be no recovery of contribution. The decision was approved and followed in the similar case of Kemerer v. State Farm
M1titual Auto hzsurance Co.

27

v. Southworth, 54 Minn. 79, 55 N. V. 818 (1893)

(indemnity) ; Minneapolis

Mill Co. v. Wheeler, 31 Minn. 121, 16 N. W. 698 (1883) (indemnity).
22. Ankeny v.Moffett, 37 Minn. 109, 33 N. W. 320 (1887).

23. In Minnesota there is no summary means for the recovery of contribution and indemnity among tortfeasors. Kemerer v. State Farm Mut.

Ins. Co., 201 Minn. 239, 276 N. W. 228 (1937). Prior to the adoption of the

Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure in 1952, there was not express provision
in the Minnesota statutes relating to cross-claims. However, there were
provisions in Minn. Stat. § 548-02 (1949) providing that ". . . when justice
so requires [the judgment] shall determine the ultimate rights of the parties

on each side as between themselves."

Before its amendment in1947, Minn. Stat. § 540.16, relating to impleader,
was inadequate for the purpose of bringing in additional defendants who
might be liable for contribution or indemnity. The amended impleader statute
was held to be broad enough to permit the defendant in a tort action to implead
a party from whom contribution might be recovered. Gustafson v. Johnson,
235 Minn. 358, 51 N. ',V 2d 108 (1952), 36 Minn. L. Rev. 543. The court
in the Gustafson case also held that the remedy of garnishment was available

if personal service could not be obtained on the party from whom contribution was sought.
Minn. R. Civ. P. 13.07 now provides for cross-claims among co-defendants,
which should considerably expedite litigation relating to contribution and

indemnity; Rule 14.01 provides for impleader of third party defendants; and
Rule 24.01 allows one to intervene as a matter of right in the action against
the joint tortfeasor. Coupled with the broad separation powers of Rule 42.02,
these three rules now give Minnesota an effective mechanism for litigating the
issues of contribution and indemnity.
24. See, e.g., Warren v. Westrup, 44 Minn. 237, 239, 46 N. W. 347,
348 (1890) ;Prosser, Torts 1113, 1117 (1941).
25. 37 Minn. 109, 33 N. W. 320 (1887).
26. 183 Minn. 182, 236 N. W. 618 (1931).
27. 211 Minn. 249, 300 N. W. 793 (1941).
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The Christenson and Kemerer decisions are not in accord with
the modern view that contribution should be liberally allowed even
where the joint tort is intentional..2 8 Furthermore, the statutes involved in the two decisions are legislative codifications of standards
of due care for highway traffic. Their violation involves negligence
in the ordinary tort suit, but the Minnesota court has given their
violation the same effect as is accorded to deliberate wrongs. According to this view the person who is at greater fault may escape
from all liability simply because the other tortfeasors violated a
minor statute.
It seems possible that the court may modify the rule of the
Christenson case. In the recent case of Hardware Mutual Casualty
Co. v. Danberry,2 9 it was contended that the trial court erred in not
instructing the jury on the effect of a willful and intentional violation of a "right of way" statute in an intersection accident case.
The court reversed on other grounds but stated that in the earlier
cases there had been a greater showing of intentional violation," ° and
to find intentional and willful negligence in the case before it would
preclude the recovery of contribution in nearly all intersection
accidents. 31
. Damages. Contribution in Minnesota results in damages being
shared equally among the tortfeasors rather than being apportioned on the basis of their comparative negligence. 32 In Great
Britain damages in the main action"3 and contribution among tortfeasors"4 are apportioned on the basis of comparative negligence.
Although Wisconsin apportions damages in the main action, the
statute 5 providing for this has been held not to apply to actions for
contribution.3 The Uniform Act contains a provision for appor28. See, e.g., 9 U. L. A. Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act,
157, 158 (1951).
29. 234 Minn. 391, 48 N. W. 2d 567 (1951).
30. In the Christenson case the statutory violation consisted of knowingly leaving a truck parked at night without any light burning, while in
the Kremnerer case it was found that the plaintiff violated the "right of way"
statute, Minn. Stat. § 169.20 (1949), by driving into an intersection although
aware of the approach of the defendant's car. In the Danberr, case, supra
note 29, the driver's vision was blocked by obstruction as he entered tile
intersection.
31. Id. at 397, 48 N. W. 2d at 570.
32. Cf. Gugisberg v. Eckert, 101 Minn. 116, 111 N. W. 945 (1907).
33. Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act, 1945, 8 & 9 Geo. 6,
c. 28, § 1.
34. Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act, 1945, 8 & 9 Geo. 6, c.
28, § 1(3) ; Law Reform (Married Women & Tortfeasors) Act, 1935, 25 &
26 Geo. 5, c. 30, § 6.
35. Wis. Stat. § 331.045 (1951).
36. Brown v. Haertel, 210 Wis. 354, 246 N. W. 691 (1933) ; see Note,
26 Marq. L. Rev. 151 (1942).
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tioning contribution on the basis of comparative negligence,37 but
and has been omitted by four
this provision is explicitly optional
38
states that have adopted the Act.

INDEMNITY

While denying contribution among those jointly liable in tort,
MJIerryweathcrv. Nixan expressly excluded from the scope of the
decision those cases in which one person was employed by another
to do acts which were not unlawful in themselves; and in Adamson
v. Jarvis" the right to recover indemnity in such a situation was
upheld.
In each case in which indemnity is allowed there is an element
of fault which attaches to both indemnitor and indemnitee. As was
pointed out in the discussion of contribution, the vital element
which the courts should consider is the wrongful nature of the acts
or omissions rather than the legal liability toward the injured person
of the one from whom contribution is sought. This same consideration should apply with equal force to indemnity actions, since
here again common liability is thought necessary. 4 The more perplexing problem, however, is that of finding a satisfactory rationale
to explain why in a given case the recovery of indemnity, which
shifts the entire burden of liability, rather than contribution, which
shifts only a part of the liability, is permitted.
The answer to this problem lies in the nature of the wrongful
conduct of the parties to the action for indemnity. The courts have
used a large number of stock phrases to explain the different character of the acts or omissions of the wrongdoers and to justify the
award of indemnity. 41One writer has said that indemnity should
be awarded when one of the tortfeasors has breached duties owed
to the other tortfeasor and the injured person. 42 However, the
existence of duties between the tortfeasors, especially in some situations where recovery of indemnity is permitted, 43 is very tenuous.
Another proposed rationale is that indemnity is permitted where
disproportionate duties are found to exist on the part of the tort37. 9 U. L. A. Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act § 2(4)
(1951).
38. Maryland, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island.
39. 4 Bing. 66, 130 Eng. Rep. 693 (C.P. 1827).
40. See Duluth, M. & N. Ry. v. McCarthy, 183 Minn. 414, 418, 236
N. W. 766, 768 (1931).
41. See Davis, Indcmnnity Between Neglige)tt Tortfeasors: A Proposed Rationale, 37 Iowa L. Rev. 517, 543 (1952).
42. See Hodges, Contribution and Thdemnity Among Tortfeasors, 26
Tex. L. Rev. 150, 162 (1947).
43. What duty but the most general can be said to be owed by a common laborer to his employer? See Davis, .rtpranote 41, at 546.
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feasors toward the injured person. 4 - However, in one common situation in which indemnity is usually allowed, that in which the indemnitee commits a trespass at the direction of the indemnitor, it is
possible to argue that the indemnitee who was the immediate
wrongdoer had a greater duty toward the injured person than the
indemnitor. It is possible that indemnity exists solely because so
many courts refuse to allow contribution ;45 and that may explain
why no one rationale is broad enough to include within its scope
all of the more common situations in which indemnity is permitted.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has used such standard terms as
"passive" and "active" 46 and "primary" and "secondary" 47 to
differentiate the negligence of the parties in an action for indemnity,
but the Minnesota decisions do not evidence the development of any
general theory about indemnity. There are, however, several situations where indemnity is usually permitted, and the Minnesota
cases tend to fall within these situations.
Vicarious liability. One of the most frequently encountered
situations where indemnity is permitted is that in which the indemnitee's original liability was based on some variation of the
doctrine of respondeat superior.4 s Within this category also are those
cases in which municipalities held liable for injuries caused by defects in public streets have been able to shift their liability to the

persons responsible for these conditions. 4 9 In cases where there was
originally an agency relationship of some sort between the parties,
the indemnity has been based upon the breach of duty to exercise
due care or act with propriety on the part of the indemnitor ;5o but
in the municipality cases, where there is no agency or fiduciary relationship between the defendant and the city, the courts have

awarded indemnity on the ground that the defendant was the origi44. Id. at 546-553.
45. See Bohlen, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tort!easors, 21
Cornell L. Q. 552, 568 (1936).
46. See Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Minneapolis Brewing Co., 214 Minn. 436,
440, 8 N. W. 2d 471, 473 (1943).
47. See id. Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Northwestern Tel. Co., 140 Minn. 229,
231, 167 N. W. 800, 801 (1918).
48. E.g., Grand Trunk Ry. v. Latham, 63 Me. 177 (1874); Hill v.
Murphy, 212 Mass 1, 98 N. E. 781 (1912) ; Northern Pacific Ry. v. Minnesota Transfer Ry., 219 Minn. 8, 16 N. W. 2d 894 (1944) ; Produce Trading
Co. v. Norfolk Southern R. R., 178 N. C. 175, 100 S. E. 316 (1919).
49. See, e.g., Topeka v. Central Sash & Door Co., 97 Kan. 49, 154 Pac.
232 (1916) ; Lowell v. Boston & L. R. R., 23 Pick. 24, 34 Am. Dec. 33 (Mass.
1839); Hart v. Noret, 191 Mich. 427, 158 N. W. 17 (1916); Wabasha v.
Southworth, 54 Minn. 79, 55 N. W. 818 (1893) ; Seattle v. Puget Sound
Improvement Co., 47 Wash. 22, 91 Pac. 255 (1907).
50. See, e.g., Georgia S. & F. Ry. v. Jossey, 105 Ga. 271, 31 S. E. 179
(1898) ; Grand Trunk Ry. v. Latham, 63 Me. 177 (1874); Hill v. Murphy,
212 Mass. 1, 98 N. E. 781 (1912).
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nal source of the wrong.51 The line of reasoning in these two situations is not inconsistent, since in the agency cases the agent is almost
invariably the original wrongdoer; but where confronted with an
agency relationship the courts find duties created by the relationship
upon which to easily base liability.
Torts committed by direction of another person. Generally, indemnity may be recovered by an employee or independent contractor who is held liable to a third person for doing a tortious
act which is not manifestly wrong at the direction of his employer or principal.52 The courts usually explain the award of indemnity by saying that the plaintiff has justifiably relied on the
principal's right to have the acts performed as he directs or by
implying a promise on the part of the principal to make indemnity."3
The former reason seems to be closer to the realities of the situation,
and the latter is merely a legal fiction. Although the issue has not
been squarely raised in Minnesota,54 it has been indicated that indemnity will be allowed in this situation.5"
Failure on the part of the indemnitee to discover the negligence
of another. Indemnity is also permitted in those situations in which
the indemnitee's liability stems from neglect to discover a dangerous
condition caused by the negligent act or omission of the indemnitor." The courts in this type of case reason that the primary or
actual wrong was done by the defendant, who caused the condition
to arise.' 7 A Minnesota case illustrative of this result is Fidelity &
Casualty Co. v. Northwestern Telephone Exchange Co., 8 in which
the plaintiff was originally liable to an injured employee because of
its failure to discover that the defendant indemnitor had negligently
51. See, e.g., Topeka v. Central Sash & Door Co., 97 Kan. 49, 154 Pac.
232 (1916) ; Hart v. Noret, 191 Mich. 427, 158 N. W. 17 (1916) ; Wabasba v.
Southworth, 54 Minn. 79, 55 N. W. 818 (1893).
52. See, e.g., Howe v. Buffalo, N. Y. & E. R. R., 37 N. Y. 297 (1867);
Hoggan v. Cahoon, 26 Utah 444, 73 Pac. 512 (1903) ; Adamson v. Jarvis,
4 Bing. 66, 130 Eng. Rep. 693 (C.P. 1827).
53. See, e.g., Howe v. Buffalo, N. Y. & E. R. R., supra note 52; Hoggan
v. Cahoon, supra note 52; Aberdeen Construction Co. v. City of Aberdeen,
84 Wash. 429, 147 Pac. 2 (1915).
54. Cf. Guirney v. St. P., A. & M. Ry., 43 Minn. 496, 46 N. W. 78,

(1890).

55. See Henderson v. Eckern, 115 Afinn. 410, 413, 132 N. W. 715, 716
(1911).
56. E.g., Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. East Texas Pub. Serv. Co.,
48 F. 2d 23 (5th Cir. 1931) ; Standard Oil Co. v. Robins Dry Dock Co., 32
F. 2d 182 (2d Cir. 1931); Standard Oil Co. v. Robins Dry Dock Co., 32
Co., 140 Ga. 309, 78 S. E. 931 (1913) ; Pullman Co. v. Cincinnati, N. 0. &
T. P. R. R., 147 Ky. 498, 144 S. W. 385 (1912).
57. See, e.g., Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. East Texas Pub. Serv. Co.,
supra note 56; Standard Oil Co. v. Robins Dry Dock Co., supra note 56;
Pullman Co. v. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. R. R., supra note 56.
58. 140 Minn. 229. 167 N. XV. 800 (1918).
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attached a wire to a utility pole which the employer and the indemnitor shared in common. The court found that the primary
duty of securing the wire was the indemnitor's, and that neglect of
this duty was the primary cause of the accident.
Negligently performed delegated duties. 'When the indemnitor
fails to perform duties undertaken by contract but ordinarily performed by the indemnitee, the indemnitee held liable in tort by reason of this neglect may recover indemnity.5 9 The failure to perform
duties which have been specifically undertaken justifies the recovery
of indemnity. In one Minnesota case a lessee recovered indemnity
from his lessor whose failure to perform a covenant to repair an
elevator on the leased premises resulted in injury to one of the
lessee's employees. 60 The early case of Minneapolis Mill Co. v.
Wheeler,61 involving the failure of a grantee to maintain a bridge
erected over the grantor's canal-which resulted in the liability of
the grantor-probably falls within this category.
EFFECT OF PRIOR JUDGMENT AS RES JUDICATA

Prior to 1943 Minnesota did not depart from the majority rule
that judgment for the plaintiff is not res judicata between codefendants.12 Thus a judgment against all defendants in the original
action would not decide their individual rights to contribution or
indemnity. 63 Even when the original action results in a judgment
against one co-defendant and in favor of another it is commonly
held that the original judgment does not prevent the losing" defendant from seeking contribution.64 In Minnesota before 1943 this
view was accepted, but in doing so, in one case the court noted that
the plaintiff in the contribution action by paying his judgment had
not discharged a common liability.65 In 1943 the court again was
faced with the situation in which an unsuccessful co-defendant
59. Georgia Power Co. v. Banning Cotton Mills, 42 Ga. App. 671, 157
S. E. 525 (1931) ; see Boston & M. R. R. v. Brackett, 71 N. H. 494, 497, 53

Atl. 304, 306 (1902).

60. Olson v. Schultz, 67 Minn. 494, 70 N. W. 779 (1897).
61. 31 Minn. 121, 16 N. W. 698 (1883).
62. See, e.g., Kemerer v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 201 Minn. 239, 276
N. W. 228 (1937); Pioneer Say. & Loan Co. v. Bartsch, 51 Minn. 474, 53
N. W. 764 (1892); Note, 27 Minn. L. Rev. 519, 528 (1943).
63. Kemerer v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 201 Minn. 239, 276 N. XV.
228 (1937).
64. E.g., Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Federal Express, Inc., 99 F. 2d 681
(6th Cir. 1938) ; Pullman Co. v. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. R. R., 147 Ky.
498, 144 S. W. 385 (1912) ; Central Banking & Security Co. v. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 73 W. Va. 197, 80 S. E. 121 (1913). But see 1 Freeman, Laws of Judgments § 425 (5th ed. 1925).
65. See Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Anderson, 191 Minn. 158, 162, 253
N. IV. 374, 376 (1934).
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sought contribution from the prevailing defendant; and it was held,
in American Motorists Insurance Co. v. Vigen, 8 that since the issue
of common liability was decided in the original action there could
be no contribution. The rule of the decision was shortly thereafter
applied in an action for indemnity. 7
The Vigen case appears to be unsound, for it allows the very
important substantive rights of contribution and indemnity to be decided in an action in which the persons concerned did not, at the
time, have adequate means or opportunity"8 to litigate the issues
among themselves. Minnesota has recently reaffirmed its adherence
to the general rule that judgment for the original plaintiff is not
res judicata among defendants, 9 limiting the doctrine of the Vigen
case to actions for indemnity and contribution.7 0 The future of the
Vigen rule seems doubtful,71 but it is probably merely of academic
interest since it is now possible for the diligent tortfeasor to litigate
the issue of contribution and indemnity contemporaneously with the
2
main action by means of intervention, impleader or the crossclaim.7
THE PROBLEMA OF INDIVIDUAL DEFENSES
One of the persistent problems of contribution and indemnity
is the effect of the fact that the person from whom recovery is sought
had a personal defense against the injured person when the tort
occurred. Since the individual defense negates the possibility of
legal liability of that tortfeasor to the injured person, it may preclude
the recovery of either contribution or indemnity. Previously, it was
pointed out that the critical element in the recovery of contribution
and indemnity should be a course of conduct on the part of the
person from whom recovery is sought rather than possible legal
liability toward the injured person. The validity of this theory can
be seen by appraising the effect of the individual defense on the recovery of contribution and indemnity. To date the Minnesota Supreme Court has considered only two of these defenses 7 3 but it is
perhaps only a matter of time before most of them will arise.
66. 213 Minn. 120, 5 N. W. 2d 397 (1942).
67.
8 N. W.
68.
69.
983.

Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Minneapolis Brewing Co., 214 Minn. 436,
2d 471 (1943).
See Note, 27 Minn. L. Rev. 519, 521 (1943).
Bunge v. Yager, 52 N. V. 2d 446 (Minn. 1952), 36 Minn. L. Rev.

70. Id. at 450.
71. See 36 Minn. L. Rev. 983, 984 n. 5 (1952).

72. Minn. R. Civ. P. 24.01, 14.01, 13.07; see Wright, Joinder of Claims
and Parties Under M][odern Pleading Rules, 36 Minn. L. Rev. 580, 593, 611,
627 (1952).
73. American Automobile Ins. Co. v. Molling, Minn. Sup. Ct, April 2,
1953) (family relationship); Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Chicago, St. P.,
U. & 0. Ry., 235 Minn. 304, 50 N. W. 2d 689 (1951) (covenant not to sue).
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Assumption of risk. If there is assumption of risk on the part
of the original plaintiff toward the negligence of one of the tortfeasors, then the courts which require the presence of common legal
liability of the party from whom contribution or indemnity is
sought could well deny recovery of either. An analogous situation
arises under the so-called guest statutes, which may cut off the
passenger's right to recover from a negligent driver but do not prevent recovery from the driver of another car. 74 Thus, courts have
refused contribution to the driver of the other car if the passenger
75
is unable to recover from the driver of the car he was riding in.
6
Family relationships. In Minnesota, neither a spouse" nor an
unemancipated minor 77 may sue the other spouse or parent in tort.
Since the domestic relationship creates an immunity, it was held in
American Automobile Insurance Co. v. Molling 7 1 that the common
legal liability which Minnesota requires in order to recover contribution is lacking where marital immunity exists between the injured
person and one of the wrongdoers. In jurisdictions which have the
common liability rule in contribution, the weight of authority supports the holding of the Minnesota court where a family relationship exists.79 This result may be logically sound, but apparently
it does not take into consideration that the tranquility of the home,
which is one of the principal reasons for domestic immunities in
tort,80 is not much endangered by a suit in which the persons within
the relationship are not opposing parties.
Statute of limitations. When the statute of limitations has run
in favor of one tortfeasor against the injured person, the courts
which have considered the problem are uniformily of the opinion
that this does not destroy the possibility of contribution.,' Common
74. See 4 Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice § 2313

(1946), for a discussion of the guest statutes.
75. Kauth v. Landsverk, 224 Wis. 554, 271 N. W. 841 (1937) ; Walker
v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 214 Wis. 519, 252 N. WV. 721 (1934);
Patterson v. Tomlinson, 118 S.W. 2d 645 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
76. E.g., Patenaude v. Patenaude, 195 Minn. 523, 263 N. NV. 546 (1935)
(pre-coverture tort) ; Drake v. Drake, 145 Minn. 388, 177 N. W. 624 (1920)
(tort committed after separation) ; Strom v. Strom, 98 Minn. 427, 107,
N. W. 1047 (1906) (tort committed during marriage; action brought after
divorce).
77. E.g., Lund v. Olson, 183 Minn. 515, 237 N. W. 188 (1931), 16 Minn.
L. Rev. 323 (1932) ; Miller v. Pelzer, 159 Minn. 375, 199 N. IV. 97 (1924)
(alternative holding), 9 Minn. L. Rev. 76.
78. Minn. Sup. Ct., April 2, 1953.
79. Yellow Cab Co. v. Dreslin, 181 F. 2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1950) ; Norfolk Southern R. R. v. Gretakis, 162 Va. 597, 174 S.E. 841 (1934) ; Zutter
v. O'Connell, 200 Wis. 601, 229 N. W. 74 (1930). Contra: Fisher v. Diehl,
156 Pa. Super. 476, 40 A. 2d 912 (1944).
80. Prosser, Torts 903, 906 (1941).
81. Adam v. Vacquier, 48 F. Supp. 275 (W.D. Pa. 1942), aff'd per
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NOTES

legal liability is present since liability comes into existence at the
instant the tort is committed; thereafter, the right to recover contribution remains inchoate until one of the tortfeasors discharges a
disproportionate share of the financial liability

2

Although the

Minnesota court has never had to consider this defense, it has expressed a somewhat similar view in discussing contribution, 3 and
it is probable that the defense would not be held to bar the recovery
of either contribution or indemnity.
Covenants not to sue. The execution of a covenant not to sue
by the injured person in favor of one of the tortfeasors might create
an individual defense which would appear to be effective in an
action to recover contribution or indemnity. 4 Yet, as was true with
the defense of the statute of limitations, this defense arises after
the conduct which creates legal liability. Thus, the reasoning which
permitted the recovery of contribution despite the running of the
statute should permit either contribution or indenmity to be recovered despite the existence of the covenant.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has considered this problem in
Employers M1utual Casualty Co. v. Chicago, St. Paul, M. & 0.
Ry.," where one tortfeasor paid the plaintiff six thousand dollars
as consideration for a dismissal and a covenant not to sue. The
other tortfeasor then settled with the plaintiff for five thousand
dollars and sought contribution from the first tortfeasor. The
court refused contribution, but in doing so stated that the execution
of the covenant not to sue did not destroy the common liability
necessary to support an action for contribution. 6 The court further
stated that "payment, to the extent that it is compensation, will
be a pro tanto reduction of... eventual liability for contribution. 5' 7
Exclusive liability in workmen's compensation. Workmen's compensation acts all provide that the employer's exclusive liability shall
curiam, 139 F. 2d 347 (3d Cir. 1943) (alternative holding) ; Godfrey v. Tide-

water Co., 223 N. C. 647, 27 S. E. 2d 736 (1943) ; Ainsworth v. Berg, 253
Wis. 438, 34 N. W. 2d 790 (1948); Battle v. Laurel Line Taxicab Co., 52
Pa. D. & C. 534 (1945).
82. Ainsworth v. Berg, 253 Wis. 438, 34 N. W. 2d 790 (1948).
83. See Gustafson v. Johnson, 235 Minn. 358, 364, 51 N. W. 2d 108,
112 (1952).
84. The covenant not to sue should not be confused with the release. A
release given to one joint tortfeasor may release all other joint tortfeasors
from liability and foreclose the injured person from bringing action against
the others. 0 vovenant not to sue does not preclude suit by the injured person
against the other tortfeasors. See Prosser, Torts 1107-1111 (1941). The Uniform Act gives the release the same effect as the covenant not to sue. See 9
U. L. A. Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act § 4 (1951).
85. 235 Minn.304, 50 N. W. 2d 689 (1951).
86. Id. at 310, 50 N. W. 2d at 693.
87. Id. at 313-314, 50 N. ,V.2d at 695.
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be for compensation under the terms of the act,"" and these provisions give rise to another individual defense. Both contribution 0
and indemnity 0 have been denied on the ground that a third person
seeking either recovery is within the "any other person" phrase of
the provision providing for exclusive liability. Contribution has also
been denied on the theory there is no common liability in tort.01
There are, however, a number of decisions which would permit the
recovery of both contribution and indemnity despite the provisions
of the acts.0 2 This is allowed on the theory that the compensation
acts were intended only to change the right of recovery between the
employee and his employer.
It is undecided in Minnesota whether this provision precludes
recovery of contribution and indemnity from an employer. There
is dicta in one case that the statute was not intended to alter the
right to recover contribution among joint tortfeasors ;93 and with
reference to the rights of an employee against a third party, the
court has pointed out that the statute changed only the rights of the
employee and the employer inter se." Thus there seems to be a
possibility that the Minnesota act would not be held to afford a
defense against either contribution or indemnity.
88. Riesenfeld and Maxwell, Modern Social Legislation 395 (1950).
E.g., Minn. Stat. § 176.04 (1949): "The liability of an employer ... shall be
exclusive and in place of any liability to such employee.. . or any other person
entitled to recover damages at common law or otherwise on account of such
injury or death, ... "

89. E.g., American Mut. Ins. Co. v. Matthews, 182 F. 2d 322 (2d
Cir. 1950) ; Coates v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 95 F. Supp. 779 (D. D.C.
1951); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vallendingham, 94 F. Supp. 17 (D. D.C.
1950); Standard Wholesale Phosphate & Acid Works v. Rukert Terminal
Corp., 193 Md. 20, 65 A. 2d 304 (1944) ; Britt v. Buggs, 201 Wis. 533, 230
N. W. 621 (1930) (alternative holding).
90. Standard Wholesale Phosphate & Acid Works v. Rukert Terminal
Corp., mtpra note 89.
91. E.g., American Mut. Ins. Co. v. Matthews, 182 F. 2d 322 (2d Cir.
1950) ; Coates v. Potamac Elec. Power Co., 95 F. Supp. 779 (D. D.C. 1951) ;
Clark v. Chicago, M. St. P. & P. R. R., 214 Wis. 295, 252 N. W. 685 (1934).
92. American Dist. Tel. Co. v. Kittleson, 179 F. 2d 946 (8th Cir. 1950) ;
Rederii v. Jarka Corp., 26 F. Supp. 304 (D. Me. 1939), appeal dismissed,
110 F. 2d 234 (1st Cir. 1940) ; Westchester Lighting Co. v. Westchester
County Small Estates Corp., 278 N. Y. 175, 15 N. E. 2d 567 (1938).
93. Thornton Bros. Co. v. Reese, 188 Minn. 5, 9-10, 246 N. W. 527, 529
(1933), 17 Minn. L. Rev. 829.
94. Gleason v. Geary, 214 Minn. 499, 8 N. W. 2d 808 (1943), 27 Minn.
L. Rev. 585.

